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This study examines the cognitive and neural determinants of honesty and dishonesty. Human subjects undergoing fMRI completed a
monetary incentive delay task eliciting responses to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens. Subjects next performed an incentiv-
ized prediction task, giving them real and repeated opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects attempted to predict the outcomes of
random computerized coin-flips and were financially rewarded for accuracy. In some trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-
reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying. Dishonest behavior was indexed by improbably high levels of
self-reported accuracy.Nucleus accumbens response in the first task, involving only honest rewards, accounted for25%of the variance
in dishonest behavior in the prediction task. Individuals showing relatively strong nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward
also exhibited increased dorsolateral prefrontal activity (bilateral) in response to opportunities for dishonest gain. These results address
two hypotheses concerning (dis)honesty. According to the “Will” hypothesis, honesty results from the active deployment of self-control.
According to the “Grace” hypothesis, honesty flows more automatically. The present results suggest a reconciliation between these two
hypotheses while explaining (dis)honesty in terms of more basic neural mechanisms: relatively weak responses to anticipated rewards
make people morally “Graceful,” but individuals who respondmore strongly may resist temptation by force of Will.
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Introduction
What makes people behave honestly or dishonestly? And can
variability in honesty be explained in terms of familiar neurobi-
ological mechanisms? The present investigation begins with two
hypotheses concerning the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty. Ac-
cording to the “Will” hypothesis, honest behavior results from
the active resistance of temptation, comparable to the controlled
cognitive processes that enable the delay of reward (Metcalfe and
Mischel, 1999; McClure et al., 2004). According to the “Grace”
hypothesis, honest behavior happens more automatically, with-
out the need for active self-control at the time of choice (Bargh
and Chartrand, 1999; Haidt, 2001). Both hypotheses have re-
ceived empirical support (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Mead et al.,
2009; Gino et al., 2011; Shalvi et al., 2012). The Grace hypothesis
is supported by fMRI and reaction time data indicating that con-
sistently honest behavior involves no additional cognitive work
(Greene and Paxton, 2009). This naturally raises the question:
What makes consistently honest individuals morally “Graceful?”
This question is particularly intriguing given that previous re-
search has identified no distinctive neural signature of honest
behavior, no pattern of neural activity corresponding to the pro-
verbial “voice of conscience.” In light of this, we hypothesized
that consistent honest behavior arises, not from the presence of a
neural voice of conscience, but from the absence of its opposite, a
neural “voice of greed.” Inmore concrete terms, we hypothesized
that moral Grace results, at least in part, from relatively weak
responses to anticipated rewards, not only when the rewards
would be gained dishonestly, but more generally. We used fMRI
to test the prediction that nucleus accumbens response to antic-
ipated rewards predicts dishonest behavior, even when such re-
sponses occur in an independent task involving no opportunity
for dishonest behavior.
Subjects undergoing fMRI completed the monetary incentive
delay (MID) task, during which they experienced brief delays
before claiming monetary rewards of variable value (Knutson et
al., 2001a,b; Fig. 1A). Specifically, the mean percentage signal
change in blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal in
anatomically defined nucleus accumbens was calculated for each
subject during reward anticipation trials (reward  neutral;
Buckholtz et al., 2010). TheMID task was originally developed to
maximize affective and motivational aspects of reward process-
ing by using rapid presentation of stimuli and rewards contingent
on behavior (Knutson et al., 2000). During a subsequent predic-
tion task, subjects attempted to predict the outcomes of random
computerized coin-flips and were financially rewarded for accu-
racy and punished for inaccuracy (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Fig.
1B). In the No-Opportunity condition, subjects recorded their
predictions in advance, denying them the opportunity to cheat by
lying about their accuracy. In the Opportunity condition, sub-
jects made their predictions privately and were rewarded based
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on their self-reported accuracy, affording them the opportunity
to gain money dishonestly by lying. In contrast with nearly all
fMRI studies of deception (Abe, 2009, 2011), the lying observed
here is genuinely dishonest lying because the present subjects
were not explicitly instructed to lie. Dishonest behavior was in-
dexed by improbably high levels of self-reported accuracy.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. The present results are based on data from 28 subjects (18 fe-
males and 10 males, mean age 21.3 years, age range 18–34 years). All
subjects were right-handed, native English speakers who had no history
of neurological or psychiatric disease. Our analyses required the classifi-
cation of subjects as honest, dishonest, or ambiguous based on self-
reported accuracy in the Opportunity condition of the coin-flip task (the
data were normally distributed; Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality test,
p 0.05). Consistent with procedures used previously (Greene and Pax-
ton, 2009), eight subjects reporting improbably high levels of accuracy at
the individual level (binomial test, p 0.001) were classified as dishonest
(mean “accuracy”  83.6%). This conservative threshold was used to
ensure a sufficient number of cheat trials per dishonest subject. The 13
lowest-accuracy subjects (binomial test, p 0.05 for the entire group of
13) were classified as honest (mean accuracy 50.1%). This is the largest
group of subjects that, at the group level, exhibit no significant evidence
of cheating. The remaining 7 subjectswere classified as ambiguous (mean
accuracy  67.1%). Although it is clear that at least some individuals
within this group behaved dishonestly (323 of 481 trials, group binomial
test, p  0.000001), we classified these individuals as “ambiguous” be-
cause none of them met our conservative threshold for confirmed dis-
honest behavior at the individual level. The classification of subjects was
used in the analysis of the data to test theGrace hypothesis and to identify
subjects for exclusion. Subjects were paid $50 for participating, in addi-
tion to the bonus pay based on performance during the experimental
tasks. Subjects gave written informed consent
in accordance with a protocol approved by
Harvard University’s Committee on the Use of
Human Subjects.
In addition to the data drawn from the 28
subjects analyzed, the data from a total of 11
subjects were discarded for reasons described
below. The exclusion criteria used in the pres-
ent study were identical to those used previ-
ously and yielded similar results (Greene and
Paxton, 2009). We emphasize that our behav-
ioral paradigm, which involves deception con-
cerning the interests of the experimenters
(though not of the payoff structures), inevita-
bly requires higher rates of exclusion than
those of fMRI experiments involvingmore typ-
ical behavioral tasks.
First, in debriefing, subjects were asked what
they thought the experiment was about in an
open-ended way. At this point in debriefing,
seven subjects classified as dishonest and two
subjects classified as honest voiced suspicions
that the experiment was about cheating, lying,
or dishonesty. We discarded the data from the
seven dishonest subjects, but not the others.
This was done to exclude data from subjects
who may have seen themselves as morally jus-
tified in deceiving the experimenters because
they believed that the experimenters were at-
tempting to deceive them. We adopted this
policy as a conservative measure, anticipating
that some may hesitate to call such deception
dishonest. We included the remaining two
honest subjects because it is not essential to our
design that honest behavior be motivated by
purely moral considerations. Second, subjects
were eventually informed of the purpose of the
experiment and were asked whether they were aware that they could
cheat. All but two subjects indicated that they were aware of the possibil-
ity of cheating. Data from these two subjects were excluded because our
aim was to investigate honest behavior in the face of opportunity for
dishonest gain, and these subjects were not aware of the opportunity.
Third, data from two subjects were discarded due to excessive response
failure (30%).
Finally, we conducted tests to identify and exclude subjects who stra-
tegically underreported their accuracy. In the present paradigm, it is
possible to gain money dishonestly while maintaining a chance level of
accuracy by cheating on the Opportunity trials that are worth the most
(i.e., $6.00 and $7.00) and deliberately underreporting accuracy for the
Opportunity trials that areworth the least (i.e., $3.00 and $4.00). Subjects
using this strategy can exhibit improbably high levels of cumulativemon-
etary reward given their win/loss percentages. To identify such subjects,
we compared the winnings of each honest subject to those of simulated
honest subjects (10,000 permutations) with win/loss percentages indi-
vidually matched to the subject being tested. The winnings of all honest
subjects were consistent with their respective win/loss percentages (p
0.05). Therefore, in the present study, no subjects were excluded for the
strategic underreporting of accuracy.
General procedures.Tomeasure neural response to anticipated reward,
we used the MID task in which subjects anticipated a monetary reward,
no reward, or the avoidance of monetary loss (Knutson et al., 2001a,b).
To measure dishonesty, we used a coin-flip prediction task in which
subjects had opportunities to gain money dishonestly by lying about the
accuracy of their predictions (Greene andPaxton, 2009).Weused a cover
story to justify our giving subjects obvious opportunities for dishonest
gain. This study was presented as a study of paranormal abilities to pre-
dict the future, aimed at testing the hypothesis that people are better able
to predict the future when their predictions are (1) private and (2) finan-
cially incentivized. Thus, subjects were implicitly led to believe that the
Figure1. A,B, Task sequence ofMID task (A) and coin-flip task (B). In theMID task (A), the subject observes the trial’smonetary
value, followed by a variable-duration fixation cross. After the fixation cross, a target square is briefly presented. The subject
presses a button while the square is on the screen to get a financial reward or to avoid a financial loss. A feedback message with
current and cumulative winnings/losses is presented. This is followed by a fixation interval. In the coin-flip task (B), the subject
observes the trial’s monetary value and privately predicts the outcome of the upcoming coin-flip. The subject records this predic-
tion by pressing one of twobuttons (No-Opportunity condition) or presses one of these buttons randomly (Opportunity condition).
The subject then observes the outcome of the coin-flip. The subject then indicates whether the prediction was accurate and
observes the amount ofmoneywon/lost based on the recorded prediction (No-Opportunity) or the self-reported accuracy (Oppor-
tunity). This is followed by a fixation interval.
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opportunity for dishonest gain was a known but unintended by-product
of the experiment’s design and that they were expected to behave hon-
estly.We note that in using this cover story, subjects were deceived about
the experimenters’ interests, but not about the economic structure of the
task. Subjects were not presented with the cover story until after they had
been recruited, thus avoiding self-selection for subjects with interests in
parapsychology. An earlier study (Greene and Paxton, 2009) used a va-
riety of personality scales in hopes of identifying familiar psychological
traits that predict dishonest behavior. None of these yielded significant
results. Thus, the present study did not include personality scales.
Before starting the experiment, we had subjects complete the Paranor-
mal Belief scale (Tobacyk andMilford, 1983) to support our cover story.
Subjects were given a thorough explanation of the task procedure and
were familiarized with the MID task and coin-flip task by completing
practice trials. At this point, some subjects mentioned to the experi-
menter that it was possible to cheat in the coin-flip task. The experi-
menter responded by acknowledging his awareness of that possibility.
The experimenter explained that the possibility of cheating was a neces-
sary by-product of the experimental design and encouraged the subject
to follow the directions, which preclude cheating if followed.
MID task. In the MID task, participants had the opportunity to win
money or avoid losing money by pressing a button during the brief
presentation of target stimulus. TheMID task session consisted of a total
of 100 trials. During each trial, participants were shown one of five cues
for 1000 ms, indicating the reward value of the trial. There were 20
high-reward trials ($5), 20 low-reward trials ($0.25), 20 high-loss trials
($5), 20 low-loss trials ($0.25), and 20 neutral trials ($0.00). Participants
were then presented with a fixation cross during a variable interval (an-
ticipatory delay phase, 2000–2500ms). Subjects respondedwith a button
press to a white target square that appeared for a variable length of time
(target phase, 150–450 ms). For reward trials, subjects gained money by
responding while the target was onscreen (a “hit”). On reward trials,
there was no penalty for failing to press the button during this time (a
“miss”). For loss trials, hits resulted in neither gain nor loss, but misses
caused the subject to lose the amount indicated by the cue for that trial.
Although no money was at stake in neutral trials, participants were in-
structed to rapidly press the button in response to the target square.Next,
a feedback screen (outcome phase, 1000 ms) notified participants of the
amountwon/lost on that trial, as well as their cumulativewinnings at that
point. A variable intertrial interval (2550–3350 ms) followed each trial.
The MID task session lasted 12.5 min. Consistent with prior proce-
dures (Buckholtz et al., 2010), we contrasted the neural activity for re-
ward versus neutral trials in the nucleus accumbens during the
anticipatory delay phase. We emphasize that this analysis focuses on
responses to possible future rewards, perhaps dependent on motivation
(Knutson et al., 2000), rather than responses to the receipt of reward.
To approximately equate MID task performance across subjects, we
used an adaptive algorithm that dynamically adjusted the duration of the
target presentation as a function of subject performance (Kuhl et al.,
2010; Hahn et al., 2011). Five independent “trains” were used, represent-
ing the five different reward or loss values. For each train, the target
accuracy was 66.0% and the duration of the target square, which was
initialized to 300 ms, was adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis, depending on
whether the running accuracy for that train was greater than or less than
66.0%. For instance, if mean accuracy in the high-reward condition after
trial n was equal to 80%, then the square duration for trial n  1 in the
high-reward condition was shortened (making the trial more difficult).
In contrast, if mean accuracy in the high-reward condition after trial n
was equal to 50%, then the square duration for trial n  1 in the high-
reward condition was lengthened (making the trial easier). In this man-
ner, the square duration was shortened or lengthened by 30 ms
increments. In addition, target duration was set as to never fall below 150
ms and to never exceed 450ms. Since this adaptive algorithmwas used to
alter target durations, reaction times cannot bemeaningfully interpreted
and are therefore not analyzed. This algorithm ensured that net earnings
were positive for all of the subjects.
Coin-flip task. In the coin-flip task, subjects attempted to predict the
outcomes of random computerized coin-flips and were financially re-
warded for accuracy and punished for inaccuracy. The subject (1) ob-
serves the trial’smonetary value andprivately predicts the outcomeof the
upcoming coin-flip (2 s), (2) records this prediction by pressing one of
two buttons (No-Opportunity condition) or presses one of these buttons
randomly (Opportunity condition; 2 s), (3) observes the outcome of the
coin-flip (1 s), (4) indicates whether the predictionwas accurate (3 s), (5)
observes the amount of money won/lost based on the recorded predic-
tion (No-Opportunity condition) or the reported accuracy (Opportu-
nity condition; 1 s), and (6) waits for the next trial (11 s). Thus, in the
No-Opportunity condition, subjects recorded their predictions in ad-
vance, denying them the opportunity to cheat by lying about their accu-
racy. In the Opportunity condition, subjects made their predictions
privately and were rewarded based on their self-reported accuracy, af-
fording them the opportunity to cheat. Subjects completed a total of 210
trials. Within the 70 Opportunity trials, the values $3, $4, $5, $6, or $7
USD each appeared 14 times, as was the case for the 70 No-Opportunity
trials. We included an additional set of 70 Low-Value-Opportunity trials
that were worth $0.02, $0.10, $0.25, $0.35, and $0.50 USD. Each of these
values also appeared 14 times. Neuroimaging data from these trials were
not analyzed because the contrasts involving this condition cannot be
controlled for monetary value. They were included to provide dishonest
subjects with additional opportunities to behave honestly at little cost,
thus giving them cover for cheating in the regular (higher-value) Oppor-
tunity trials. Subjects were paid the cumulative value of their winnings/
losses. Net losses were capped at $0, and net winnings were capped at $75
(not including participation payment and MID bonus money). Trials
appeared in random order in a series of 7 blocks of 30 trials each. Each
block of the coin-flip task lasted10min. Subjects’ understanding of the
experiment was assessed in debriefing (see above). They were asked
about their thoughts and experiences during the experiment in an open-
ended way. Subsequently, subjects were informed of the true nature of
the experiment andwere askedwhether theywere aware of the possibility
of cheating.
In the present version of the coin-flip task, the buttons for random
responding in the Opportunity condition are labeled “left” and “right”
rather than “heads” and “tails.” This change from past procedures
(Greene and Paxton, 2009) was implemented to further reduce the (al-
ready small) proportion of subjects who are unaware of the possibility of
cheating.
The following instructions were presented to subjects on a computer.
Thank you for participating. In this study your job is to predict the
outcomes of computerized random coin flips. Youmay not think that
you have the ability to do this, and that’s okay. Just do your best. You
may be surprised at what you can do! Press any key to continue.
It has been suggested that people makemore accurate predictions
when they are motivated to predict accurately. To test this idea, we
will be providing youwith varying levels of financial incentive. Before
each coin flip happens, an amount ofmoneywill appear on the screen
(e.g., $0.25 or $5.00). This is the amount of money that you will win
or lose depending on whether you accurately predict the outcome of
the coin flip. If your prediction is correct, then you win the amount
of money shown. If your prediction is incorrect, you lose the amount
ofmoney shown. The computer will keep track of all of your wins and
losses. If, at the end of the experiment, your money total is positive,
youwill be paid that amount. If your total is negative or zero, youwill
not win any additional money. This is not pretend money. This is
real money that you will be paid based on your performance in the
experiment. However, your winnings cannot exceed $75. Press any
key to continue.
It has been suggested that people’s ability to predict the future is
disrupted if they have to record their predictions externally (i.e.,
outside of theirminds). To test this idea, wewill sometimes ask you to
report your prediction in advance. In other cases, you will simply tell
us after the fact whether or not your prediction was correct. Press any
key to continue.
Before each coin flip you will see the dollar amount that the trial
is worth and, below it, the word “PREDICT” on the screen. At that
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point you should make your prediction in your mind. Next you will
either see the word “RECORD” or the word “RANDOM.” If you see
the word “RECORD” you should press the button on the LEFT
to indicate that you are predicting HEADS or the button on the
RIGHT to indicate that you are predicting TAILS. If you see theword
“RANDOM” then you should randomly press either the LEFT but-
ton or the RIGHT button. When you make random responses, you
should not follow any fixed pattern. Press any key to continue.
Next you will see the word “HEADS” or “TAILS” appear on the
screen. This is the outcome of the computerized coin flip. After that
you will see a screen that says “CORRECT?” At that point you must
indicate whether or not your prediction was correct. If you were told
to hit a random button, it does not matter which button you hit.
Whether or not your prediction was correct depends only on the
prediction you made in your mind and the outcome of the coin flip.
Press the LEFT key to indicate (YES) that your prediction was cor-
rect. Press the RIGHT key to indicate (NO) that your prediction was
incorrect. If you failed to form a prediction before the outcome of the
coin flip was revealed, then you should indicate that your prediction
was incorrect. After you have said whether your prediction was cor-
rect, the computer will tell you how much money you won or lost on
that coin flip. Press any key to continue.
You will make a total of 210 predictions. You will do these in 7
groups of 30 trials. There will be about 10 s between the end of one
trial and the beginning of the next one. After each group of trials you
will have a chance to rest. The whole task will take a little less than 90
min. Press any key to continue.
You are now ready to practice. Remember, first comes the dollar
amount telling you what the coin flip is worth and the word
“PREDICT.” At that point you will make your prediction privately
to yourself. (Note that the dollar amounts presented here will not
count toward your final total.) Then you will see either “RECORD”
or “RANDOM.” If you see “RECORD” enter your prediction (LEFT
key for HEADS, RIGHT key for TAILS). If you see “RANDOM”
press either the LEFT key or the RIGHT key randomly. Then youwill
see the outcome of the coin flip (HEADS or TAILS). Then youwill see
the word “CORRECT?” on the screen. At that point you indicate
whether the prediction youmade in your mind was correct. Press the
LEFT key (YES) if your prediction was correct or the RIGHT key
(NO) if your prediction was incorrect. Then the computer will tell
you how much money you won or lost on that coin flip. Then you
wait for the next coin flip, which will begin with a dollar amount, as
before. Press any key to begin practicing.
Image acquisition and data preprocessing. Whole-brain imaging was
performed with a 3.0 tesla Siemens Magnetom Tim Trio MRI scanner
with a 12-channel head coil. A T2*-weighted echoplanar imaging (EPI)
sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast was used for functional imaging
with the following parameters: repetition time (TR)  2500 ms, echo
time (TE) 30 ms, flip angle 90°, 72 72 acquisition matrix, field of
view (FOV)  216 mm, and in-plane resolution  3  3 mm. Thirty-
nine axial slices, with a slice thickness of 3 mm, were obtained. A high-
resolution (spatial resolution 1.2 1.2 1.2 mm) structural image was
also acquired using a T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid-
acquisition gradient echo (MP-RAGE) pulse sequence.Headmotionwas
restricted using firm padding that surrounded the head. Visual stimuli
were projected onto a screen and were viewed through a mirror attached
to the head coil. The subjects’ responses were collected using a magnet-
compatible response box. The EPI images were acquired in eight consec-
utive runs (i.e., one for theMID task and seven for the coin-flip task). The
first four scans in each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration
effects.
Data preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK).
All volumes acquired from each subject were corrected for different slice
acquisition times. The resultant images were then realigned to correct for
small movements occurring between scans. This process generated an
aligned set of images and a mean image per subject. Each participant’s
T1-weighted structural MRI was coregistered to the mean of the re-
aligned EPI images and segmented to separate out the graymatter, which
was normalized to the gray matter in a template image based on the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain. Using the pa-
rameters from this normalization process, the EPI images were also nor-
malized to the MNI template (resampled voxel size 2 mm 2 mm 2
mm) and smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximumGaussian
kernel. A high-pass filter of 1/128 Hz was used to remove low-frequency
noise, and an AR(1) (autoregressive 1) model was used to correct for tem-
poral autocorrelations.
Statistical analysis. The fMRI data were analyzed using an event-
related model. Each task (MID task and coin-flip task) was analyzed
separately. For the MID task, all reward trials (high-reward and low-
reward), loss trials (high-loss and low-loss), and neutral trials were
pooled. Onsets for the anticipatory delay period of each of the trial types
were separatelymodeled using a canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion. The right and left anatomical nucleus accumbens regions of interest
(ROIs) were derived from Individual Brain Atlases using Statistical Para-
metric Mapping Software (IBASPM; Alema´n-Go´mez et al., 2006) imple-
mented in theWFU PickAtlas (Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem,
NC; Maldjian et al., 2003). To quantify neural response to anticipated
reward across subjects, we used MarsBaR software (Brett et al., 2002) to
extract percentage change in BOLD signal of the nucleus accumbens for
each condition (i.e., averaged across all trials of a given condition) for
each subject. The percentage change values for neutral trials during the
delay period were subtracted from those of the reward trials (collapsed
across monetary value). We used this mean signal change value for each
subject to predict each subject’s level of dishonesty, i.e., each subject’s
self-reported %Wins in Opportunity condition of the coin-flip task.
For the coin-flip task’s fMRI data, all events of interest were modeled
through convolution with a canonical hemodynamic response function
temporally indexed by participants’ responses. The parameter estimates
(betas) for each condition were calculated for all brain voxels, and the
following two contrasts of parameter estimates were computed: Oppor-
tunity Win vs No-Opportunity Win and Opportunity Loss vs No-
Opportunity Loss. The first contrast identifies signal differences
associated with (but not exclusively associated with) dishonest behavior.
The second contrast identifies signal associated with honest behavior in
the presence of opportunity for dishonest gain. In the neuroimaging
analysis of the coin-flip task, the data from two subjects were excluded
because of their extremely low number of Opportunity-Loss trials (two
for both subjects). This low number of Opportunity-Loss trials pre-
vented us from obtaining a stable activation map for these subjects. The
exclusion of these two subjects explains why analyses using fMRI data
from the coin-flip task are based on 26 subjects, instead of 28, as in the
Table 1. Themean proportions and the reaction times of subjects’ responses
Proportion (%) Reaction time (ms)
Group Condition Mean SD Mean SD
Honest OpWin 50.1 6.6 496 103
Op Loss 49.9 6.6 569 98
No-OpWin 49.9 6.0 503 98
No-Op Loss 50.1 6.0 571 134
LV-OpWin 49.6 7.2 498 98
LV-Op Loss 50.4 7.2 604 108
Ambiguous OpWin 67.1 2.0 602 144
Op Loss 32.9 2.0 719 171
No-OpWin 50.5 5.0 594 117
No-Op Loss 49.5 5.0 639 143
LV-OpWin 52.4 6.6 624 178
LV-Op Loss 47.6 6.6 732 152
Dishonest OpWin 83.6 8.8 539 148
Op Loss 16.4 8.8 775 365
No-OpWin 50.8 5.9 477 111
No-Op Loss 49.2 5.9 559 179
LV-OpWin 55.9 18.8 584 248
LV-Op Loss 44.1 18.8 608 191
Op, Opportunity; LV, low-value.
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analysis correlating response to reward in the
MID task with dishonest behavior. The con-
trast images for the remaining 26 subjects were
then entered into a series of multiple-
regression analyses, in which the results gener-
ated by the independent MID task are used as
predictors of activity in the prefrontal control
network. Specifically, we examined the rela-
tionship between the response to reward in the
MID task (the signal change averaged across
right and left nucleus accumbens) and the ac-
tivity across brain regions for Opportunity
Win vsNo-OpportunityWin andOpportunity
Loss vs No-Opportunity Loss in the coin-flip
task. The significant activations were identified
at the statistical threshold of p 0.001 (uncor-
rected formultiple comparisons) with the clus-
ter size of 10 ormore voxels. The peak voxels of
clusters exhibiting reliable effects are reported in MNI coordinates. We
also generated graphs showing time courses of percentage change in
BOLD signal after participants’ responses. Data for these graphs were
generated by modeling decision-related BOLD data using a finite im-
pulse response function. The finite impulse response model makes no
assumptions about the shape of activations, thereby providing unbiased
estimates of the average signal intensity at each time point for each event
type. In each subject, the mean percentage change in BOLD signal was
estimated for each of six scan acquisitions after each decision (0–15 s
after decision). Time courses were subsequently averaged across partici-
pants and event types.
Results
Behavioral data
During the MID task, participants succeeded on an average of
63.5% (SD  4.8) of the trials. Thus, the proportion of hits is
highly consistent with the target value selected based on previous
reports (Knutson et al., 2001a,b; Kuhl et al., 2010; Hahn et al.,
2011). There was no correlation between the winnings in the
MID task and the self-reported %Wins in the Opportunity con-
dition across subjects (r0.23, p 0.244). Thus, we succeeded
in minimizing differences in reward history before the coin-flip
task and prevented such differences from exerting a detectable
influence on subsequent behavior.
The results of the coin-flip task are summarized in Table 1. All
three groups of subjects (Honest, Dishonest, Ambiguous) were at
chance performance in the No-Opportunity condition. Thus, we
found no evidence for subjects having paranormal abilities to
predict the future (Bem, 2011). To determine whether the reac-
tion time data support the Grace hypothesis, we conducted
planned contrasts following a 3 (group:Honest, Ambiguous,Dis-
honest) 3 (condition: Opportunity, Low-Value-Opportunity,
No-Opportunity) 2 (outcome: Win, Loss) ANOVA. A Green-
house–Geisser correction for sphericitywas usedwhennecessary.
As expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant three-way inter-
action (F(3.17,39.64) 2.95, partial 
2 0.19, p 0.042).
Following up on this three-way ANOVA, we first consider
Win trials. In the first of our planned contrasts, we compared
Opportunity Win trials (which include both honest and dishon-
est Wins) with No-Opportunity Win trials (which include only
forced honest Wins). Within the dishonest group we found a
significant difference in reaction time between these two condi-
tions (t(7)  2.60, p  0.035). This finding raises the possibility
that dishonest Wins involve additional controlled processing,
leading to longer reaction times. Within the ambiguous group,
we found no significant difference in reaction time between Op-
portunityWin trials and No-OpportunityWin trials (t(6) 0.32,
p  0.762). Similarly, within the honest group, we found no
significant difference in reaction time between these two condi-
tions (t(12)0.34, p 0.743). Here the critical test is to deter-
mine whether a group  condition interaction was significant
within Win trials from honest and dishonest groups. As the re-
sults of these contrasts suggest, there was a significant group 
condition interaction (F(1,19)  4.80, partial 
2  0.20, p 
0.041).We also comparedOpportunityWin trials with Low-Value-
OpportunityWin trials. Here we found no significant differences in
reaction timebetween these twoconditions forhonest group(t(12)
0.12, p 0.906), ambiguous group (t(6)0.69, p 0.516), and
dishonest group (t(7)0.96, p 0.370).
Next we consider Loss trials.Within the dishonest group, Op-
portunity Loss trials involve decisions to refrain from dishonest
behavior, whereas No-Opportunity Loss trials involve only
forced Losses. We found a significant difference in reaction time
between these two conditions (t(7) 2.56, p 0.037). This find-
ing indicates that additional controlled processing is required
when dishonest subjects forgo opportunities for dishonest gain.
Notably, this effect was also observed in the ambiguous group.
We found a significant difference in reaction time between Op-
portunity Loss trials and No-Opportunity Loss trials (t(6) 2.53,
p 0.045). Critically, within the honest group we found no sig-
nificant difference in reaction time between Opportunity Loss
trials and No-Opportunity Loss trials (t(12)0.07, p 0.948).
Here the critical test is to determinewhether a group condition
interaction was significant within Loss trials from honest and
dishonest groups. As the results of these contrasts suggest, there
was a significant group  condition interaction (F(1,19)  9.32,
partial 2 0.33, p 0.007). These findings replicate the results
of previous work (Greene and Paxton, 2009) and clearly support
theGrace hypothesis, suggesting that consistently honest subjects
engage no additional processing when they forgo the opportuni-
ties for dishonest gain.We note that the Grace hypothesis and the
Figure 2. Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens predicts the frequency of dishonest behavior in an inde-
pendent task (n 28). The x-axis shows for each subject themean difference in the nucleus accumbens’ BOLD response to reward
versus neutral trials during theMID task. The y-axis shows each subject’s self-reported%Wins in the Opportunity condition of the
coin-flip task, an index of dishonesty. Coloration shows anatomically defined ROIs superimposed on a standard brain. NAcc,
Nucleus accumbens.
Table 2. Regions exhibiting positive correlations between response to anticipated
reward in the nucleus accumbens in the MID task and difference inmean signal
change for chosen (Opportunity) Loss trials versus forced (No-Opportunity) Loss
trials
Coordinates
Region (Brodmann’s area) x y z Z value Cluster size
Right superior parietal lobule (7) 20 74 52 3.75 49
Right middle frontal gyrus (9) 34 14 54 3.52 13
Left middle frontal gyrus (46) 38 30 42 3.33 17
Left inferior occipital gyrus (18) 28 94 8 3.17 15
p 0.001 uncorrected; minimum cluster size 10.
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data supporting it concern only the cognitive processes engaged
at the time of the behavioral response. This leaves open the pos-
sibility that subjects in the honest groupmade “willful” decisions
to behave honestly at the outset of the task or at some earlier point
in their lives.
We also compared Opportunity Loss trials with Low-Value-
Opportunity Loss trials. Although we found no significant differ-
ences in reaction time between these two conditions for the
ambiguous group (t(6)  0.29, p  0.785), the analyses from
thehonest anddishonest groups yieldednotable results.Within the
dishonest group, the reaction time for Opportunity Loss trials was
marginally longer than that for Low-Value-Opportunity Loss trials
(t(7)  2.31, p  0.054). Within the honest group, the reaction
time for Opportunity Loss trials was shorter than that for Low-
Value-Opportunity Loss trials (t(12)2.39, p 0.034). As the
results of these two contrasts suggest, there was a significant
group condition interaction (F(1,19) 11.76, partial
2 0.38,
p 0.003). This interaction suggests that the reaction time effects
observed in the present study depend critically on monetary
value.Moreover, it provides additional support for the claim that
additional controlled processing is required when forgoing dis-
honest gain for the dishonest group, but not for the honest group
(Greene and Paxton, 2009).
In the present study, we also tested for correlations between
the frequency of dishonest behavior and reaction times for the
various trial types (Opportunity Win, Opportunity Loss, No-
Opportunity Win, and No-Opportunity
Loss). Here we examine all subjects to-
gether. As expected, we found no signifi-
cant correlations between the frequency
of dishonest behavior and reaction times
for No-Opportunity Win trials (r 
0.06, p  0.773) and No-Opportunity
Loss trials (r  0.07, p  0.739), respec-
tively. Likewise, we found no significant
correlation between the frequency of dis-
honest behavior and reaction times for
Opportunity Win trials (r  0.22, p 
0.264). However, we did find a positive
correlation between the frequency of dis-
honest behavior and reaction times for
Opportunity Loss trials (r  0.53, p 
0.004). These results again support the
Grace hypothesis: honest subjects do not
engage additional cognitive control in any
case (i.e., are honest “Gracefully”), but
dishonest subjects engage more control,
particularly when refraining from behav-
ing dishonestly.
fMRI data
Following the method of Buckholtz et al.
(2010), we first calculated for each subject
the mean difference in nucleus accum-
bens BOLD signal for the reward versus
neutral trials in the MID task. Here, the
nucleus accumbens was delimited using
bilateral a priori anatomical ROIs. We
confirmed that the nucleus accumbens
activity was significantly higher for high-
reward trials ($5) than for low-reward tri-
als ($0.25; left nucleus accumbens, t(27)
8.14, p 0.000001; right nucleus accum-
bens, t(27) 8.96, p 0.000001; normality of the data was con-
firmed for all parametric tests; Kolmogorov–Smirnov
normality tests, all p 0.05), indicating that the present MID
task is a valid measure for neural responses associated with
reward anticipation.
We then tested our main hypothesis by calculating the corre-
lation between this measure of neural response to anticipated
reward and our measure of dishonest behavior, subjects’ self-
reported %Wins in the Opportunity condition of the prediction
task. (Once again, not all self-reported Wins are dishonest.
Rather, self-reported % Wins is correlated with the level of dis-
honesty.) As predicted, nucleus accumbens response correlated
positively with the frequency of dishonest behavior (left nucleus
accumbens, r  0.49, p  0.008; right nucleus accumbens, r 
0.45, p 0.015; bilateral average, r 0.50, p 0.007; normality
of the data was confirmed for all parametric tests; Kolmogorov–
Smirnov normality tests, all p 0.05). Thus, the nucleus accum-
bens signal during the MID task accounted for 25% of the
variance in dishonest behavior (bilateral average R2 0.25; Fig.
2). We emphasize that the MID provides a measure of reward-
related response that is independent of subjects’ responses to the
rewards available in the coin-flip task.
Second, we asked whether response to anticipated reward in
the nucleus accumbens predicts activity within the prefrontal
control network during the coin-flip task. Here, our hypothesis is
that individuals with relatively large nucleus accumbens re-
Figure 3. Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens predicts DLPFC activity when refraining from gaining
money dishonestly (n 26). Bilateral DLPFC regions exhibited positive correlations ( p 0.001, uncorrected) between mean
response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens (averaged across right and left regions) during the MID task and the
difference inmean signal change for chosen (Opportunity) Loss trials versus forced (No-Opportunity) Loss trials. Graphs show time
courses of mean decision-related percentage change in BOLD signal during the coin-flip task for the honest, ambiguous, and
dishonest groups. Signal time courses are displayed across 6 time-bins of 2.5 s each.
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sponses to anticipated reward will require additional cognitive
control to forgo available rewards. We tested this hypothesis us-
ing a whole-brain analysis. More specifically, the nucleus accum-
bens signal in the MID task (the signal change averaged across
right and left nucleus accumbens) was entered as a covariate of
interest in a regression analysis contrasting Opportunity Loss vs
No-Opportunity Loss trials. As predicted, we observed effects
bilaterally in the middle frontal gyrus (dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; DLPFC; Table 2, Fig. 3). The effects observed in the
DLPFC do not survive correction for multiple comparisons (p
0.001 uncorrected) and should therefore be interpretedwith cau-
tion. Nevertheless, the fact that these effects are bilateral and
consistentwith a strong a priori hypothesis reduces the likelihood
that they are due to chance. These effects were not observed in a
regression analysis contrasting Opportunity Win vs No-
Opportunity Win trials. Thus, it appears that individuals with
greater nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward in the
MID task also exhibit greater engagement of DLPFC when for-
going opportunities for dishonest gain during the coin-flip task.
We also conducted subtraction analyses of Opportunity Win
vs No-Opportunity Win trials (to identify neural activity associ-
ated with choosing to behave dishonestly) and Opportunity Loss
vs No-Opportunity Loss trials (to identify neural activity associ-
ated with choosing to refrain from dishonest behavior) for hon-
est, ambiguous, and dishonest groups (Table 3). The critical test
for the Will and Grace hypotheses is the comparison between
Opportunity Loss trials and No-Opportunity Loss trials. Consis-
tent with previouswork (Greene and Paxton, 2009), we predicted
increased engagement of DLPFC during honest decisions in the
dishonest group, but not in the honest group. Consistent with
this prediction, we found significant activation in the right mid-
dle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) in the contrast of Opportunity Loss vs
No-Opportunity Loss in the dishonest group. Combining the
data from dishonest and ambiguous groups, we found significant
activation in left middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC). Parallel DLPFC
effects were not observed in the honest group.
Discussion
We used fMRI and two independent behavioral tasks to test the
prediction that response to anticipated reward in the nucleus
accumbens predicts behavior in a laboratory test of honesty. In-
dividual differences in reward-related response were indexed by
the level of fMRI BOLD signal in the nucleus accumbens during
the anticipation of reward in the MID task. Dishonest behavior
was indexed by improbably high levels of self-reported accuracy
in our incentivized coin-flip prediction task. As predicted, indi-
viduals exhibiting relatively strong nucleus accumbens responses
to anticipated reward exhibited higher rates of dishonest behav-
ior. Such individuals also exhibited (at an uncorrected threshold)
increased bilateral engagement of a key region within the prefrontal
control network (DLPFC) when refraining from dishonesty.
These findings illuminate the cognitive and neural determi-
nants of honesty and dishonesty in three key ways. First, they link
honesty and dishonesty to individual variation in a coremamma-
lian neural system, the mesolimbic reward pathway, which uses
mechanisms that have been conserved across evolutionary time
(Schultz et al., 1997; O’Doherty, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008; Haber
and Knutson, 2010; Shohat-Ophir et al., 2012). These findings
also link everyday dishonesty to clinically relevant conditions.
Previous studies using the MID task have linked reward-related
responses in the nucleus accumbens to psychopathic traits
(Buckholtz et al., 2010) and Gray’s impulsivity (Hahn et al.,
2009). These results, alongwithmore recent evidence concerning
trait-positive arousal in healthy individuals (Wu et al., 2014),
indicate that responses to anticipated reward as measured by the
MID reflect stable traits. However, further research will be
needed to determine whether the neural signals of the kind ob-
served here can predict dishonest behavior at significant delays.
Second, these findings support the Grace hypothesis, while
refining it in an interestingway. Consistent with themore general
Grace hypothesis (Greene and Paxton, 2009), our results show
that variation in automatic processing is associated with the ten-
dency to be honest and to engage a key part of the prefrontal
control network (MacDonald et al., 2000; Miller and Cohen,
2001; Seeley et al., 2007; Badre, 2008) when behaving honestly.
The present results take this hypothesis a step further, indicating
that consistent honesty is associated with automatic dispositions
that are domain-general, i.e., not specific to the moral domain
(Shenhav and Greene, 2010). As an alternative, one might hy-
pothesize that consistently honest individuals areGracefully hon-
est because they have a specific lack of attraction to dishonest
rewards, much as people have a specific lack of sexual attraction
to close kin (Lieberman et al., 2007). For example, an honest
financier might respond no less than others to the prospect of
honestly earned profits, but automatically discount the value of
money to be gained by insider trading. Our results, however, are
consistent with the hypothesis that Graceful honesty arises, at
least in part, from amore general tendency to place less value on,
or to be less motivated by, monetary rewards, independent of the
reward’s moral status.
Table 3. Results of planned fMRI contrasts
Coordinates




Op Loss No-Op Loss
Left lingual gyrus (18) 24 66 10 4.35 42
Left fusiform gyrus (37) 30 32 22 3.70 23




Op Loss No-Op Loss
Left intraparietal sulcus (7) 26 50 44 3.88 19
Left precentral gyrus (6) 36 10 52 3.77 23
Right precentral gyrus (6) 62 12 24 3.62 25
Left inferior parietal lobule (2/40) 52 28 38 3.51 11
Dishonest
OpWin No-OpWin
Right inferior frontal gyrus (45) 46 22 4 3.57 13
Op Loss No-Op Loss
Left anterior cingulate cortex (25) 4 32 0 4.38 16
Left hippocampus 14 16 14 4.15 18
Right middle frontal gyrus (45/46) 42 34 32 3.97 16
Ambiguous and dishonest
OpWin No-OpWin
Left anterior cingulate cortex (32) 8 20 38 3.56 17
Op Loss No-Op Loss
Right anterior cingulate cortex (32) 16 14 38 3.79 11
Left orbitofrontal cortex (47) 32 26 12 3.72 73
Left middle frontal gyrus (46) 40 52 10 3.65 31
Left anterior cingulate cortex (24) 6 34 14 3.63 88
Left insula 38 6 0 3.55 48
Left medial superior frontal gyrus (32) 6 30 36 3.53 86
Left inferior frontal gyrus (45) 38 36 12 3.30 11
p 0.001 uncorrected; minimum cluster size 10. Op, Opportunity.
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We emphasize that none of our results, from either the MID
task or the coin-flip task, can be explained by systematic differ-
ences in reward history produced by performance on a prior task.
We used two key design features to preclude effects of reward
history. First, all subjects performed the MID task first, followed
by the coin-flip task. Second, by using a staircase design, MID
task performance and, thus, reward history across subjects were
approximately equated (see above; Materials and Methods).
Third, our results suggest a reconciliation between the evi-
dence supporting the Will and Grace hypotheses. Although the
present results indicate that relatively weak responses to antici-
pated reward are associated with Graceful honesty, other evi-
dence suggests that Will (active self-control) also plays a role in
honest behavior, with “moral identity” (Gino et al., 2011) and the
availability of justifications (Shalvi et al., 2012) as moderating
factors. The present correlational evidence is consistent with an
alternative (though notmutually exclusive) hypothesis: relatively
weak responses to anticipated reward make people morally
Graceful, but individuals with stronger responses may resist
temptation by force of Will. This is consistent with our finding
that nucleus accumbens response predicts dishonest behavior. It
is also consistent with our (more tentative) finding that nucleus
accumbens response predicts engagement of the DLPFC when
people forego opportunities for dishonest gain. Although we be-
lieve that this interpretation provides the most coherent account
of the present results in light of the literature, the present results
do not rule out an earlier interpretation (Greene and Paxton,
2009) according to which the engagement of the DLPFC reflects
additional controlled processing that is not preferentially associ-
ated with the Willful resistance of temptation.
To infer from the observed DLPFC effect the engagement of
cognitive control in this specific task requires a “reverse infer-
ence” (Poldrack, 2006), but reverse inferences are by no means
categorically fallacious (Hutzler, 2014; Machery, 2014). Tasks re-
quiring high levels of control reliably engage the DLPFC (Mac-
Donald et al., 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Seeley et al., 2007;
Badre, 2008). However, the extent to which the aforementioned
inference is justified depends on the extent to which the engage-
ment of DLPFC selectively indicates the engagement of cognitive
control. At the very least, the observed DLPFC effect, along with
concomitant reaction time effects, is highly consistent with the
engagement of cognitive control, and Willful self-control more
specifically.
Three further limitations of the present study warrant at-
tention. First, although our task design allows us to identify
dishonest behavior at the level of individual subjects (by iden-
tifying improbably high levels of self-reported Wins), it does
not allow us to identify individual lies. This is because most
OpportunityWin trials are won honestly, with only a minority
of Opportunity Win trials involving decisions to lie. Second,
we do not know whether the reward-related responses mea-
sured here generalize to non-monetary rewards or to mone-
tary rewards available in other contexts. Third, our primary
results are correlational, preventing us from drawing firm
conclusions concerning causal relationships between neural
responses and (dis)honest behavior.
Despite these limitation, the present findings do suggest that
the neural responses to reward are important cognitive and neu-
robiological determinants of (dis)honesty. More specifically, it
appears that honesty gets a boost if one’s response to available
rewards—both honest and dishonest—is somewhat tepid.
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